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Kistler: Financial Aspects of Stock Options

Giving executives stock options in lieu of a salary
increase can often
the company more than the
executive gains in tax savings. This article suggests a
realistic method of determining the salary level where
both sides—executive and company—benefit—

FINANCIAL ASPECTS
OF STOCK OPTIONS
by Linda H. Kistler
Lowell Technological Institute

have been a popu
lar means of executive com
pensation at the upper executive
level for a number of years. Issu
ance of a stock option gives the

recipient the privilege of buying
a
specified number of shares in his
company for a specified sum at a
specified future date. Thus the
company can reward the executive
without the outlay of cash, and—
provided the terms do not violate
any of the numerous restrictions
placed on these plans by the In
tock options
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ternal Revenue Service—the execu
tive may reduce the tax rate on
this part of his compensation by
substituting capital gains for ordi
nary income taxation.
For the executive, the chief ap
peal of stock options is financial.
If he is in a high income tax
bracket, the savings may be sub
stantial. The advantages to the
company are less tangible. There
is a tendency to regard options
without cost to the company since
no money must be paid out. In the

final analysis this attitude is un
justified. By selling shares at a
price below the market the com
pany foregoes the difference be
tween the actual seling price and
the price for which the stock
could have been sold. Further
more, it loses the tax deduction it
would have had if the compensa
tion had been paid in cash.
The purely financial aspects of
stock options are not the control
ling ones from the company’s point
of view, however. The principal
23
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and made cash more attractive (by
from stock options to equal the tax
to give executives a stake in the
company’s profitability — and thus
reducing basic income tax rates).
and other costs of the options to
This death has not yet occurred.
the corporation.
an incentive to work harder. In
That fact offers additional evidence
some cases the fact that cash need
On the basis of 1965 income tax
that a simple cost versus benefit
not be expended may be a major
rates, Robert R. Frei1 concluded
analysis is not a sufficient basis for
that an executive and his wife fil
consideration. For young, growing
deciding when and to whom stock
ing a joint return would need to
companies without the cash to pay
options should be given.
have income in excess of $100,000
high salaries, the stock option may
Such an analysis, however, while
per year in order for the individ
be an important tool in attracting
not the whole story, is an essential
ual’s tax saving to overbalance the
talent.
ingredient of such a decision. This
corporation’s cost. A similar con
type of analysis is the subject of
clusion is reached by application
Nonfinancial considerations
this article, which presents a mathe
of the simple model developed by
matical model for determining at
Daniel M. Holland and Wilbur G.
Even from the option recipient’s
what income level an executive
Lewellen.2 If 1965 tax rates are
point of view, the financial con
derives enough benefit from a stock
substituted into their formula, a
siderations may not be the only
option to justify the cost of giv
marginal tax rate of 61 per cent
ones. Prestige, the opportunity
ing it.
becomes the indifference point.
invest in a promising enterprise
It is obvious that comparatively
whose shares otherwise may not be
few of the executives now receiv
readily available, the chance
Indifference point
ing stock options earn taxable inrealize profit with reduced riskAs a criterion for the selection
all have their appeal.
of executives to whom stock op
Many predicted a slow death for
tions could be offered efficiently,
stock options when the Revenue
1 Robert R. Frei, “Stock Options in the
Light of the 1964 Revenue Act,” Taxes,
several writers have recommended
Act of 1964 both made options less
December, 1964, pp. 872-888.
a compensation indifference point
attractive (by requiring that stock
2 Daniel M. Holland and Wilbur G. Lew
method of analysis. The compen
purchased under options be held
ellen, “Probing the Record of Stock Op
sation indifference point is the in
for three years to qualify for capi
tions,” The Harvard Business Review,
come level the executive must
tal gains treatment rather than the
March-April, 1962, pp. 132-150.

The Revenue Act of 1964, with its significant changes in the re
quirements for capital gains treatment of stocks acquired under stock
options, caused many writers to predict the slow death of such options.
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Several sources have recommended a "compensation indifference" method of analysis for determining which
executives should be offered a stock option and which would be better off with a standard salary increase.

come in excess of $100,000 a year
(especially in view of the current
income averaging provisions). On
the basis of these analyses a cor
poration might well conclude that
it should curtail its as
stock option
program.
The option situation appears
more favorable, however, when the
simple formulation is revised to ap
proach reality more closely. This
article summarizes, first, the anal
ysis proposed by Holland and
Lewellen and, second, the revised
model proposed by this author. To
unify the analysis, the notations of
Holland and Lewellen are used
throughout.
Original model

The basic formula for the indif
ference point (the point at which
the overall combined cost to the
corporation and executive from in
creased salary equals the cost of
an option gain, with each alterna
tive equally costly to the com
pany) is as follows:
C (1-Tg) =

(1-TP)

In deriving this equation it was
necessary to make the salary and
option alternatives equally costly
to the company so that the com

pany would be indifferent
to
which alternative was utilized.
C is the amount of option gain
to the executive, i.e., the spread
between the fair market value
the shares at the date of exercise
and the option price at the date of
grant. C is also the cost of the op
tion to the company since the
corporation, theoretically at least,
could have sold the shares at the
market price but actually sold them
for less (the option price). No
adjustment in the company’s cost
is made for tax factors since no tax
deductions may be made by the
company when an option is granted
or exercised.
The amount of option gain to the
executive after taxes is C (1-Tg),
where Tg is the capital gains tax.
(The maximum capital gains tax
rate of 25 per cent is assumed to
be applicable to most executives
who would receive options.)
Had the company decided to
give a salary increase rather than
an option gain, it could have given
—at the same cost—in place of dol
lars of option an amount equal to
C
, where Tc is the corporation
1-TC
tax rate (48 per cent in 1966, as
suming corporate profits in excess
of $25,000). The after-tax income to

where Tp is the marginal personal
tax rate.
To determine the marginal per
sonal tax rate at the indifference
point the final formula is as fol
lows :
T*p + l- (l-Tg) (1-Te)

Substituting current tax rates into
this equation and solving for T*, we
find that a marginal personal tax
rate of 61 per cent becomes the in
difference point. Thus, an execu
tive would have to earn taxable in
come of more than $100,000 for an
overall tax and other cost advan
tage to arise from giving an option
gain rather than a salary increase.
For an executive whose taxable
income is in excess of $100,000 the
overall cost (employee tax cost and
corporation cost) is minimized
when any additional compensation
to the executive is in the form of
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accordingly.
When
an option
gain rather
than and
a salary
flotation costs are considered, the
increase.
This model provides a simple
formula may be restated in final
method for determining which ex
form as follows:
ecutives should be offered stock op
Tp*
(1-TC)
tions (from the purely financial
point of view). However, the mar
R(l-F)-1
ginal tax rate it indicates is so high
[(R-1) Tg-RF] + Tc
that the number of executives re
ceiving stock options would be
where F is the rate of flotation
drastically reduced if management
costs and R is the ratio of fair
actually utilized it.
market value of the stock at the
date of exercise to the option
price.
(The formula reduces to the
Revised model
original model if a flotation rate of
A simple change in the model
zero is assumed.) The value ratio
not only would make it more re
R is necessary in order to define
alistic but also (in many cases)
the option gain to the employee.
would reduce the indifference
point to a lower level. This revi
Illustration
sion is based on a closer analysis
of the corporation’s cost.
The general applicability of the
In the original model the cost
revised formula can be demon
of the option to the company is
strated by means of an illustration.
A simple change in the
defined
the difference between
Assume that a company wants to
the fair market value of the shares
give X dollars of additional com
classic indifference point
at the date of exercise and the op
pensation to a number of its ex
tion price at the date of grant.
ecutives but also wants to mini
model not only would make
Thus, if the market price of the
mize the overall tax and other
it more realistic but would
stock is $100 and the company is
costs, considering the corporation
obligated to issue a share under
and the employee as a team.
reduce the indifference point
option for only $70, the company
The company, which has issued
apparently incurs a cost of $30.
shares to the public in the past,
to a lower level. This revision
This formulation overlooks a sig
estimates its flotation costs to be
is based on a closer analysis
nificant factor. When a corporation
5 per cent of the gross proceeds
sells shares to the public, the net
from
a public issuance. That is, in
of the corporation’s cost.
proceeds per share from the issu
the past, every dollar of stock pro
ance are less than the current price
ceeds was reduced by five cents
because of costs of flotation, under
of flotation costs; therefore, F in the
writing costs, and dealer discounts.
equation is equal to .05. Assume
The amount of such costs varies
further that the company plans
widely but has been estimated to
to grant any stock options at the
average 5 to 15 per cent of the
fair market value at the date of
grant. (This is required for a quali
gross amount receivable when the
fied stock option under the Rev
stock is sold to the public.
enue Act of 1964.) Furthermore,
If a share of stock were sold
if any options are issued, the op
publicly for $100, the corporation
tionee may not exercise the option
might receive only $90 (assuming
and purchase stock until one year
a 10 per cent flotation rate). It is
following
the date of grant. (The
the market price less flotation costs
waiting period could be any length
that must be compared with the
of time, but a common requirement
option price to obtain a realistic
is one year.)
“cost” of the option to the com
Management has to make an
pany. In the illustration previously
“educated estimate” of the fair
cited, the cost to the company
market value of the company’s
would be $20, not $30.
It is possible to incorporate the
stock one year after the date of
factor of flotation costs into the
grant if the company is going to
original formulation and to revise
evaluate objectively the results of
26
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Management has to make an "educated estimate" as to the fair market
value of the company's stock one year after the date of grant if
company is going to evaluate honestly a salary gain vs. an option gain.

a salary gain versus option gain
decision. The estimate of fair
market value one year in the fu
ture cannot be exact, of course.
However, utilizing past experi
ence, current market conditions,

and future expectations regarding
market behavior, it would be pos
sible to construct a series of prob
able market values one year hence.
The tools of statistical probability
could be employed.
For purposes of illustration we
shall arbitrarily assume there is a
.99 probability that the market
value will increase to 1.3 times the
option price in one year (R = 1.3)
and a .75 probability the market
value will be 1.5 times the option
price in one year.
It is now possible to substitute
the various estimated fair market
values into the formula and cal
culate two indifference points. Our
tax percentages would be as fol
lows: (Tc), the corporate tax rate,
is .48; (Tg), the capital gains rate,
is .25; (F), the flotation rate, is .05;
and marginal personal tax rates for
1966 would apply.
Substituting into the revised for
mula, if R is 1.3, the marginal per
sonal tax rate is 50.2 per cent. We
can conclude that an executive
whose ordinary taxable income is
above $52,000 should receive addi
tional compensation as option gain,
rather than as salary increase, if the
March-April, 1967
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overall cost is to be minimized.
Assuming that the market value
of the stock rises to 1.5 times the
option price (R = 1.5), the mar
ginal personal tax rate would be
54.1 per cent under the revised
formula. An executive should have
ordinary taxable income in excess
of $64,000 before he should be
given an option gain instead of a
salary increase in order to mini
mize the overall cost.
More realistic results

Results more nearly in accord
ance with reality are obtained
from the revised model. In the or
iginal model we found that only
when an executive’s taxable income
exceeded $100,000 would it be ef
ficient to give an option gain rather
than a salary gain. In the revised
model the indifference point varies,
depending upon estimates of the
fair market value of the stock at
the date of exercise.
The addition of flotation costs
adds realism to the simple model
and provides a more useful man
agement tool for the selection of
executives to whom options might
be offered. In addition, the revised
analysis indicates that executives
whose income levels are much
lower than $100,000 can efficiently
be granted options as a compensa
tion device. The complicating fac

tor of flotation costs makes it ap
pear that the high income brackets
usually mentioned when options
are discussed may not be realistic.
Application

The revised model introduced
here could easily be applied to the
salary versus option decision prob
lem. The model would provide a
realistic starting point for the selec
tion of executives to whom options
should be given. A corporation
using the model could substitute
facts descriptive of its own circum
stances, could solve the equations,
and could then use the results as
one criterion for selection of op
tionees.
A re-examination of option poli
cies probably would be valuable
for many companies. If overall cost
to the corporation and tax to the
employee is to be minimized, those
executives whose salaries do not
exceed the indifference point of
the revised model probably should
not receive options unless other
considerations are deemed more
important by management. Selec
tivity is an important consideration
when options are granted, and the
revised model presented here
should be a valuable management
tool in developing a realistic and
rational basis for option versus sal
ary decision problems.
27
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